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Abstract 
Human embryonic stem cell research has generated much hope, but also fear and repulsion. National legislators, 
as well as the European Parliament, the European Patent Office and the European Court of Justice have had to 
make decisions relating to what is or is not allowed in the field of hESC research and patenting, and their 
decisions are often difficult to reconcile. In order to understand this divergence and the specific restrictions that 
different regulators impose, insight is needed into the different opinions regarding the moral status of the pre-
implantation embryo (blastocyst), into the moral distinction between using IVF embryos donated for research 
versus creating embryos for research purposes, and into the moral distinction between producing and using 
hESC lines for non-commercial research and allowing such production and research in a commercial or 
industrial setting. While one need not agree that all of these perceived differences are in fact morally relevant, 
knowing that many people perceive them as being relevant is in itself valuable for understanding the debate and 
the decisions that different regulators make. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Throughout Europe there is a great 
divergence of policies addressing human 
embryonic stem cell research (hESCR), 
reflecting the contrasting views that exist 
with regard to the ethical permissibility of 
using human embryos for research 
purposes. In this article, an overview is 
presented of the main ethical 
considerations that lie at the heart of 
different European policies. 
 
REGULATION OF HUMAN EMBRY-
ONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH IN 
EUROPE 
 
 Since the first hESC line was 
established in 1998, many European 
countries have enacted specific legislation 
to regulate stem cell research (1). One 
issue that all countries agree upon, is that 
reproductive cloning should not be 
pursued, however there is little agreement 
on any other aspect. The most permissive 
countries, namely Belgium, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK, allow research on existing 
hESC lines, hESC derivation and even 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), but 
they have installed regulatory bodies and 
ethics committees to ensure oversight. 
Moderate countries, for example France 
and The Netherlands, allow hESC research 
and hESC derivation, but only from spare 
IVF embryos (that is, embryos that were 
created in the course of an IVF treatment, 
but that will not be transferred to the 
patient) that were donated for research. In 
the group of the most restrictive countries 
we find Germany and Italy, where SCNT 
and hESC derivation are forbidden, hESC 
research on imported stem cell lines is 
subjected to strict limitations and no public 
funding is available for this research. 
Ireland and Poland also forbid hESC 
derivation but have no specific legislation 
that either allows or forbids hESCR on 
imported hESC lines. Due to this great 
divergence, collaboration between 
researchers from different countries is 
fraught with numerous difficulties (2). 
 At the European level, article 18 of 
the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine of 1997 (also known as the 
Oviedo convention) states that “[w]here 
the law allows research on embryos in 
vitro, it shall ensure adequate protection of 
the embryo” and “[t]he creation of human 
embryos for research purposes is 
prohibited” (3). A majority of European 
countries has signed this convention and 
numerous countries have also ratified it. 
The UK and Belgium have neither signed 
nor ratified the convention, as they allow 
embryo creation for research purposes 
under certain conditions. Another 
agreement that is important at the 
European level, is the agreement that was 
reached in 2006 – after much debate – to 
include hESCR as eligible for EU funding 
in the Seventh Framework programme for 
research and technological development. 
Researchers can apply for EU funding if 
their research involves the use of existing 
hESC lines and if it is not forbidden in the 
country where it will be performed. 
However, EU funds cannot be used for the 
derivation of hESC lines. This agreement 
on EU funding is remarkable, as it means 
that the countries on the restrictive side of 
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the spectrum contribute to the funding of 
research projects in foreign countries that 
are forbidden in their own territory. 
 
WHERE IT ALL STARTS: THE 
MORAL STATUS OF THE HUMAN 
EMBRYO 
 
 How can we explain this wide 
variance in European policies? The main 
issue dividing European lawmakers and 
citizens alike, is what degree of moral 
status should be conferred upon the 
embryos used in the research (4-11). 
Embryonic stem cells are typically 
obtained by isolating and culturing the 
inner cell mass of a human blastocyst, 
which is a 5 day old embryo. By 
performing this isolation, the embryo is 
destroyed, which is ethically troubling for 
a large number of people. Three different 
lines of moral reasoning can be discerned 
in the debate.  
 First, one can take the principled, 
deontological stance that the destruction of 
human embryos represents such a great 
infraction of respect for human dignity that 
it is never justified, regardless of the 
benefits that it might lead to. This position 
is for example taken by the Roman 
Catholic Church, as a logical consequence 
of its teachings that ensoulment takes place 
at the time of conception and that therefore 
the killing of an embryo equals murder, 
even at a very early stage of development. 
This explains why countries such as 
Ireland and Poland, two nations where 
Catholicism is very widespread, are 
explicitly opposed to hESCR.  
 Second, at the other end of the 
spectrum we also find a principled 
position, namely, that human blastocysts 
have none of the properties (such as 
sentience or self-awareness) on the basis of 
which dignity or respect might be due to 
them. Therefore, embryo destruction is no 
greater infringement on human dignity 
than the destruction of human cells and it 
can certainly not be compared to the 
destruction of a person. If one adheres to 
this position, the destruction of embryos is 
a trivial matter which should be allowed 
even if the possible gains for humanity are 
small. While this is a stance that is 
certainly present in the European 
population and which is quite prominent in 
the philosophical literature on the subject, 
it is not adopted as such by any European 
country, as even the most permissive 
countries have specified minimum 
requirements for the scientific validity and 
relevance of the research for which 
embryos are used.  
 Third, between these two extremes 
is the position that while one cannot 
recognise the same status for embryos that 
one does for „full-grown‟ human beings, 
the facts that they can grow into human 
beings and that they are generally 
cherished by their progenitors require us to 
treat them with a level of respect that is not 
absolute, but not trivial either. This stance 
leads to a utilitarian balancing between the 
benefits of the research for which embryos 
are destroyed and the disadvantage of 
embryo destruction itself. If the benefits 
outweigh the disadvantage, then embryo 
research is ethically justified.  
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 Almost all European legislations 
reflect this compromise position. However, 
there is little uniformity between the 
different policies as the balancing act is 
highly dependent on the moral status that is 
recognised for the blastocyst. Whereas the 
first two (extreme) positions we discussed 
represent a very clear opinion about the 
moral status of the embryo (either absolute 
or absent), within this third position we 
find a wide spectrum of opinions about the 
degree of respect that blastocysts should be 
treated with. As it is most unlikely that all 
European countries will ever reach a 
mutual standpoint on the issue of the moral 
status of the embryo, the European Union 
considers ethical standpoints to be the 
authority of the Member States. 
 
SPARE IVF EMBRYOS DONATED 
FOR RESEARCH VERSUS EMBRYOS 
CREATED FOR RESEARCH 
 
 Besides the different views on the 
moral status of blastocysts, there are also 
other factors at play in shaping stem cell 
policies. As a general pattern, there is for 
example a much lower degree of 
acceptance for the creation of embryos 
specifically for research purposes than for 
the use of embryos that were created in the 
course of an IVF treatment, but that are 
„left over‟ when patients decide to forego 
further treatment. It is remarkable that this 
distinction is at play not only in the 
intermediate countries‟ legislations, but 
also in both the more restrictive and the 
more permissive legislations. For example, 
the Oviedo convention (intermediate) 
allows stem cell derivation from IVF 
embryos donated for research, but not from 
embryos created for research purposes, 
Germany (restrictive) allows the 
importation of stem cell lines that were 
derived from IVF embryos donated for 
research under certain conditions, but not 
of those derived from embryos created for 
research, and Belgium (permissive) only 
allows the creation of embryos for research 
purposes if the research goals cannot be 
obtained with spare IVF embryos. 
 This begs the question as to what 
the morally relevant differences are 
between destroying an IVF embryo 
donated for research and destroying an 
embryo created for research (4, 12-15). 
Merely referring to the balancing act 
between the moral status of the embryo 
and the benefits of the research is not 
sufficient here, as there is no reason why 
embryos created for research would have a 
higher moral status than spare IVF 
embryos. On the contrary, IVF embryos 
tend to be very valuable to the patients for 
whom they were created. However, there 
are other factors at play. An ethical 
distinction between using donated IVF 
embryos versus embryos created for 
research can for example be based on the 
„doomed embryo rule‟ (16) or the „nothing 
is lost principle‟ (17). As the spare IVF 
embryos are already doomed to be 
destroyed, whether or not they are used for 
research purposes does not change the 
number of embryos that are being 
destroyed. Only the method of destruction 
changes and there is no reason to regard 
one method as worse than the other. The 
use of spare IVF embryos donated for 
research therefore does not increase the 
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disadvantages, but it does increase the 
benefits, so that the utilitarian calculus is 
better when they are used in research than 
when they are left to perish. This means 
that in the case of spare IVF embryos, 
there is even a moral imperative to use 
them rather than to simply discard them 
(18). This is not the case when embryos are 
being created explicitly for research 
purposes, as in that case, the disadvantages 
increase due to an additional number of 
embryos being „sacrificed‟.  
 The doomed embryo rule is 
intuitively very persuasive, but this 
argument neglects the fact that the 
embryos are not doomed by an 
uncontrollable twist of fate, but rather by 
how IVF treatments are routinely 
performed, namely by overstimulating the 
ovaries and fertilising more oocytes than 
are needed. The existence of spare 
embryos can be avoided by fertilising only 
one or two oocytes per cycle and 
transferring all the embryos instead of 
cryopreserving some of them. Italy, for 
example, implemented a rule that all 
created embryos should be immediately 
transferred to avoid the existence of spare 
embryos.  
 The only way, then, that the 
doomed embryo rule can still be applied, is 
if one starts from the premise that the 
creation and destruction of embryos during 
IVF treatment is morally justified, but not 
in hESCR. There are two possible 
arguments to support this stance, a 
consequentialist one and a deontological 
one. First, one might argue that the benefits 
of IVF treatment are greater than those of 
hESCR (so that the utilitarian calculus is 
positive for the former, but negative for the 
latter). If and when hESCR delivers on its 
promise to revolutionize regenerative 
medicine, this argument may become hard 
to maintain, but at present, it is a 
defensible stance (although even in this 
experimental phase, not all would agree 
that hESCR is an undertaking inferior to 
infertility treatment). Second, one could 
refer to the difference in intention at the 
time of embryo creation and the doctrine of 
double effect. In IVF treatment, the doctors 
who create an embryo do not have the 
intention to destroy it afterwards, but to 
transfer it to an IVF patient. Only in those 
cases where the patient later decides that 
she does not want her embryos to be 
transferred to her womb (or that of another 
woman), embryo destruction becomes part 
of the enterprise of infertility treatment, but 
merely as a side-effect of the original, 
intended goal, which is reproduction. 
However, in hESCR, the researchers who 
create an embryo do have the intention to 
destroy it (from the onset), as the goal they 
pursue – stem cell derivation – requires the 
prior destruction of that embryo. It is 
therefore not a side-effect, but a crucial 
step and as such it cannot be said to be 
unintended. In other words, while IVF 
embryos are created with the possibility of 
„self realisation‟ in mind, research embryos 
are reduced to instruments of science. 
Based on this distinction, people may 
approve the creation of embryos for IVF, 
but not for research purposes.  Once the 
embryos are created and it turns out that 
they will eventually not be transferred, 
opponents of the creation of embryos for 
research may still approve the use of IVF 
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embryos donated for research based on the 
„nothing is lost‟ principle. 
 This second argument has two 
weaknesses. The first one is that although 
those who create embryos for IVF 
treatment do not intend to destroy them, 
they can foresee that a certain percentage 
of them will eventually be destroyed so 
that they cannot be completely „absolved‟ 
from responsibility in this matter. A second 
one is that although the intent to destroy 
the IVF embryo may be absent at the time 
of creation, it is not absent at the time 
when they are used for hESCR. In other 
words, although the fertility specialist may 
not intend to destroy the embryo, the stem 
cell researcher does. 
 As a counter argument, supporters 
of the use of IVF embryos donated for 
research but not of embryo creation for 
research might refer to the concept of 
complicity and the separation principle. 
The separation principle was first 
introduced in the context of research on 
aborted foetuses and it requires that the 
decision to abort precedes the decision to 
use the foetal tissue in research. This way, 
the researcher who uses the foetal tissue 
cannot be judged to be an accomplice to 
the alleged moral wrong of abortion, 
although he or she indirectly benefits from 
it. In the distinction between using donated 
IVF embryos rather than creating embryos 
for research, the same idea can be invoked. 
When embryos are specifically created for 
research purposes, the researchers decide 
that these embryos will be destroyed and 
can therefore be held morally accountable. 
When donated IVF embryos are used, the  
researcher had no impact on the decision 
not to transfer these embryos to the womb 
and can thus not be morally accountable 
for the decision that they are to be 
destroyed. However, is this argument 
convincing? Building further on the 
analogy with the use of foetal tissue, it is 
not difficult to see that there is a crucial 
difference between a researcher using 
foetal tissue after an abortion and one 
removing the inner cell mass of a 
blastocyst. The blastocyst is destroyed 
during and because of the manipulations 
carried out by the researcher, while the 
foetus is no longer alive when the 
researcher performs his/her research on the 
tissue. Therefore, whereas the separation 
between the researcher and the killing of 
the foetus is complete, that between the 
researcher and the killing of the embryo is 
not. 
 In short, we can conclude that there 
are differences between using donated IVF 
embryos versus creating embryos for 
hESCR in terms of consequences, intent 
and/or complicity, which are deemed 
morally relevant by some people. At the 
same time, based on the counterarguments 
that were presented, one can also adopt the 
stance that these differences are not 
morally relevant (12-13). In any case, the 
creation of embryos for research purposes 
is seen by some countries (such as The 
Netherlands) as „crossing the line‟ into an 
absolute wrong that is forbidden under 
every circumstance and by others (such as 
Belgium) as a wrong that requires more 
justification than the destruction of an IVF 
embryo donated for research. 
P Belg Roy Acad Med Vol. 1:.127-139   H. Mertes 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
133 
DERIVING STEM CELL LINES 
VERSUS USING EXISTING STEM 
CELL LINES 
 
 Besides the distinction between the 
use of IVF embryos donated for research 
and the creation of embryos for stem cell 
derivation, another distinction that is 
deemed morally relevant by several 
countries and which is also embedded in 
the Seventh Framework programme, is that 
between the derivation of new hESC lines 
and the use of existing hESC lines. As 
mentioned above, EU funding is granted 
for hESC research, but not for hESC 
derivation, and Germany allows research 
on imported hESC lines (if derived from 
spare embryos before May 1
st
 2007), but 
does not allow derivation in its territory. 
Again, the basis for this distinction is the 
concept of complicity.  
 Various theories have been 
proposed regarding moral complicity. 
Some regard causation as a necessary 
condition (either only direct causation or 
also indirect causation), while others also 
include benefiting from evil or tolerating 
evil as sufficient conditions (14, 19-21). 
By not allowing stem cell derivation, but 
nevertheless allowing research on imported 
hESC lines, countries can escape 
responsibility by direct causation (a 
researcher using an existing stem cell line 
cannot be said to have killed the embryo 
from which the line was derived) and again 
rely on the argument that the utilitarian 
calculus will be better if existing stem cell 
lines are put to a good use, than when they 
are not (which is the same reasoning that 
can be applied to defend the use of spare 
IVF embryos donated for research).  
 However, one can also reject the 
idea that researchers using existing stem 
cell lines are not responsible for the 
destruction of embryos. Even if one is 
willing to accept that it is theoretically 
possible to benefit from an act that is 
perceived as wrong without becoming an 
accomplice to the wrong (21), the chain of 
complicity is difficult to break completely 
in the context of hESCR (22, 23). This is 
due to a combination of two factors: the 
variety of regulations throughout the world 
and the fact that the (alleged) wrong is not 
completely in the past, but is part of an 
ongoing field of research. If all countries 
would decide that only research on existing 
stem cell lines was allowed but that no new 
lines could be created (so that the 
destruction of embryos for research 
purposes was completely in the past), one 
might say that those researchers who never 
derived a stem cell line themselves cannot 
be held accountable for embryo destruction 
(although not everyone would agree (14)). 
However, given the fact that embryo 
destruction is ongoing in more permissive 
countries, one might imagine researchers 
from those countries „catering‟ to 
researchers in less permissive countries by 
producing the particular stem cell lines that 
are needed. To avoid this, Germany only 
allows research on stem cell lines that were 
derived before a cut-off date, which is 
currently May 1
st
 2007. However, the 
effectiveness of this cut-off date is 
undermined by the fact that it is not 
eternally fixed (22, 24). In fact, Germany  
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originally set the cut-off date as January 1
st
 
2002, but later moved it as more recent cell 
lines proved to be of better quality. The 
quality of hESC lines will continue to 
improve and, especially when the research 
moves towards clinical trials, new lines 
that are free from animal-derived products 
will be needed. Thus, it can already be 
foreseen that the cut-off date will be 
moved again in the future. Moreover, even 
if researchers from permissive countries 
are not literally catering to those in 
restrictive countries, it is quite likely that 
findings from research on existing hESC 
lines will lead to new research in more 
permissive countries and thus lead to more 
embryo destruction.  
 In short, while a country can limit 
the extent of its complicity by allowing 
importation of hESC lines, but not 
derivation, some kind of „residual 
complicity‟ is inescapable. For those who 
consider moral complicity to be a black-or-
white concept (either one is responsible for 
a harm, or one is not), the distinction 
between stem cell derivation and research 
on existing lines will therefore be 
insufficient to render the former 
unacceptable and the latter acceptable. 
However, for those who consider moral 
complicity to be a gradual concept so that 
the responsibility of researchers using 
existing hESC lines is outweighed by the 
benefits of the research, while the 
responsibility of those who derive the 
hESC lines is not, the distinction will be 
morally relevant. 
 
 
 
ALLOWING RESEARCH VERSUS 
ALLOWING PATENTS 
 
A final morally relevant distinction that is 
made at the European level, is that between 
performing hESCR, which is allowed and 
funded (each under specific circumstances, 
see above) on the one hand and patenting 
the results of this research on the other 
hand, which is not allowed. The European 
Parliament passed a resolution in 2005 
which “insists that the creation of human 
embryonic stem cells implies the 
destruction of human embryos and that 
therefore the patenting of procedures 
involving human embryonic stem cells or 
cells that are grown from human 
embryonic stem cells is a violation of 
Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive” (25). The 
Article referred to states that “inventions 
shall be considered unpatentable where 
their commercial exploitation would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality; […] 
the following, in particular, shall be 
considered unpatentable: […] uses of 
human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes” (26). 
 There are two important cases 
regarding the patentability of hESCR. The 
first one has become known as the WARF-
case and was decided by the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office in 2008 (27). The second one is 
Brüstle vs Greenpeace and was decided by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
2011 (28). 
 The WARF-case refers to a patent
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application for compositions containing 
hESCs that was filed by the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation in 1996 and 
that was denied based on rule 28(c) of the 
European Patent Convention, which states 
that European patents are not granted in 
respect of biotechnological inventions 
which concern uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes. In its 
ruling the Enlarged Board of Appeal made 
it clear that whether or not the embryo 
destruction is itself part of the invention as 
defined in the patent application is 
irrelevant if, at the date of filing of the 
application, the products claimed in the 
application “could be prepared exclusively 
by a method which necessarily involved 
the destruction of the human embryos from 
which the said products are derived” (27). 
However, as argued by Sterckx and 
Cockbain (29), the ruling left a “deposit 
loophole”, meaning that patentability could 
be acknowledged if a hESC line was 
deposited in a stem cell bank prior to the 
patent application being filed so that it 
could be used as a „source material‟ 
allowing future attempts to perform the 
invention to be carried out without further 
embryo destruction. 
 This deposit loophole was closed in 
the Brüstle vs Greenpeace case. In this 
case, Greenpeace sought the annulment of 
a German patent that was held by Olivier 
Brüstle, relating to neural precursor cells 
derived from hESCs. The German 
Bundesgerichtshof asked the European 
Court of Justice for a clarification of 
Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC on 
the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions. In this case, clarification was 
sought on three questions: (1) What is 
meant by the term “human embryos” in 
Article 6(2)(c)? (2) What is meant by the 
expression “uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes” in the 
same article? (3) Is technical teaching to be 
considered unpatentable pursuant to 
Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive even if the 
use of human embryos does not form part 
of the technical teaching claimed within 
the patent, but is a necessary precondition 
for the application of that teaching?  
 Following the opinion of advocate 
general Yves Bot, the ECJ ruled that (1) 
entities arising from either the fertilisation 
of a human oocyte or from somatic cell 
nuclear transfer, as well as parthenotes, are 
to be considered as embryos; (2) the 
exclusion from patentability concerning 
the use of embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes covers the use of 
human embryos for purposes of scientific 
research; (3) inventions are excluded from 
patentability where the technical teaching 
which is the subject-matter of the patent 
application requires the prior destruction of 
human embryos or their use as base 
material.  
 This ruling was ill received by most 
stem cell scientists and their supporters 
(30). Although the court insists that it did 
not make any moral judgement on hESCR 
as such, but only applied the existing EU 
Directive, its specific interpretations in 
answering all three questions are rather on 
the restrictive side of the spectrum than on 
the permissive one. Regarding the 
definition of the embryo, the fact that 
parthenotes are included, for example, is 
not an obvious choice, as parthenotes lack 
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paternal imprinting and are therefore 
inherently incapable of completing 
embryogenesis. Although they carry 
human DNA and originate from 
reproductive tissue (an oocyte), they are an 
early stage of ovarian teratomas, not of 
humans.  
 The answer to the second question 
is equally un-obvious. The ruling was 
based on the idea that a patent application 
is by definition in the realm of commerce 
or industry and that the research leading to 
the subject of the patent application must 
be deemed to have taken place in the 
commercial or industrial context, 
irrespective of the context in which it 
actually took place.  
 The answer to the third question is 
probably the most controversial as it 
explicitly goes further than the WARF case 
(by closing the deposit loophole), and – if 
consistently applied – may have far 
reaching consequences even beyond the 
field of hESCR. By not only excluding the 
commercial or industrial use of embryos as 
such from patentability, but instead 
extending this exclusion to every invention 
that was based on earlier embryo 
destructive research, a whole range of 
inventions in the field of medically assisted 
reproduction and ironically also the entire 
field of iPS cell research are excluded, as 
this field of research relies heavily on 
findings from hESCR. The court could 
have avoided this implication by 
specifying that inventions are excluded 
from patentability only when there is a 
material link between the destroyed 
embryo and the performance of the 
invention, and not when there is only an 
informational link. However, as it is stated 
now, it is extremely restrictive. 
 How far reaching the implications 
of the case at hand will be, remains to be 
seen. First, the verdict only applies to 
European patent applications, so 
researchers can still file patent applications 
in, for example, the US or Asia. Second, 
although the decision in the Brüstle vs 
Greenpeace case is interpreted by many as 
a conviction of hESCR, it neither prohibits 
the research or the commercial exploitation 
of its results, nor the patenting of „side 
products‟ such as culture media. Also, in 
theory, the absence of patents in this field 
can have both a limiting and a liberating 
effect. On the one hand, less funding from 
European private companies and even from 
public funding institutions (as the 
„valorisation‟ aspect of a funding 
application is increasingly important) is to 
be expected. On the other hand, 
researchers are no longer restricted by 
patents that are held by their competitors 
and that are now considered to be invalid. 
At present, it is therefore unpredictable 
what the overall ramifications of these 
rulings in patent law will be for hESCR. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Since the first derivation of human 
embryonic stem cells in 1998, this research 
field has instilled hope, but also fear and 
repulsion. National legislators, as well as 
the European Parliament, the European 
Patent Office and the European Court of 
Justice have had to make decisions relating 
to what is or is not allowed in the field of 
hESC research and patenting, and their 
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decisions are often difficult to reconcile. 
This means that Europe has become a 
patchwork of very permissive, very 
restrictive and intermediate positions. In 
order to understand this divergence and the 
specific restrictions that different 
regulators impose, insight is needed into 
the different opinions regarding the moral 
status of the pre-implantation embryo 
(blastocyst), into the moral distinction 
between using IVF embryos that are 
donated for research versus creating 
embryos for research, and into the moral 
distinction between producing hESC lines 
and using them for non-commercial 
research and allowing such production and 
research in a commercial or industrial 
setting. While one need not agree that all 
of these perceived differences are in fact 
morally relevant, knowing that many 
people perceive them as being relevant is 
in itself valuable for understanding the 
debate and the decisions that different 
regulators make. 
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